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CHAPTER I.
A STATEIENT 0' THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS, ITS EXTENT, REASONS and IMPORTANCE.
(1) STATEMENT OF THE DOCTRINE.
The rule -of Stare Decisis is of ancient origin. Precisely when it became a distinctly established doctrine of English law is not easy to detormine.
In Croke's Reports in the seventeenth year of the reign of James I, 1584, (Cro.Jac.,527) the reporter summarizes the ratio decidendi thus: "Wherefore, upon the first argument it was adjudged for the defendant, for they said that those things which have been so often adjudicated ought to rest in peace." This seems to be a very accurate and condensed expression of the doctrine.
The name Stare Decisis is taken from the Latin maxim, stare decisis et non quieta movere, and the trans lation of the maxim is a good definition of the rule itself: To stand by prechdent and not to disturb what is settled. It may be called the doctrine of precedent or of authority. Its meaning is that when a point of law has been once solemnly and necessarily sei.tled by the decision of a competent court it will no longer be considerod upen to xamination or to a new ruling by the saoe tribunal or those which are bound to follow its adj udications.
The general rule as laid down by the authorities i,; as follows: "Precedents and rules must be followed unless flatly absurd or unjust; for though their reason be not obvious at first view, yet we owe such a deference to former times as not to supi-ose that they acted wholly without consideration;" but "if it be found a former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it
is declared~noL that such a sentence was bad law, but that it was not law."
(1 Blackstone's Commentaries, pp.69-70.)
It might be considered as a kind of legal axiom that courts should not exercise their jurisdiction in any random manner for this would speedily land everything in "confusion worse confused." Of necessity there must be certain fixed land-marks apj roaching correctness, though not infallibly perfect; and courts should be guided by these even though a rigorous adherence to them might at tines work individual hardship.
These land-marks are, of corse, yrior decisions servinm as precedents not lightly to be changed.
(2) EXiEyT 01P THE DOCTRIAO. , [475] [476] [477] [478] [479] Carrcll v. Carroll, 16 IHow., 2, 37) refers to it expressly as "a rule which belongs to the common law" and there is an implication in the orinion that it is limited to "courts orrganized under the conanon
That it is a doctrine or rule of the cormnn law there is no doubt, but that it belongs to the common la,. in any exclusive sense of origin, application or usage is incorrect. In the first place, it is a rule equally applicable and equally applied in equity as in the common law. Thus Blackstone says, in repelling th e idea that equity consists of the "opinion of the judre":
*The system of our court of equity is an elaborate, connected system governed by established rules and bound down by precedents from which they do not depart alt o :-the reason of some of them may perhaps be liable to o1-jection." "May,' he adds, "sometiies a precedent is so strictly followed in equity that a particular audrment founded upon special circumstances !gives rise to a ren- should be, though opposites, yet co-operative, and constantly in action. And it is highly proper that time should largely enter into the authority, the sacredness and the veneration attaching to customs and rules established by the legal wisdom and learning of form, ner sages of the law. For the longer a rule has continued the more thoroughly has it become interwoven with the business and property interests of the community at large, and therefore the more disasterous must be the change, especially a sudden change. When once a principle has been fully recognized it should not be changed unless it is found to be unbearably wrong or unless it is changed or abrogated by the legislature, to whom the correction of errors ought usually to be left. "There are rules concerning whicih it is more important that they should be in some way settled than that they should be settled in any particular mannor.
CHAPTER II.
PROPER LI .JITATIONS OF THE DOCTRINJE. The I-rinciple of
Stare Decisis is subject to certain necessary and propor limitations which on the one hand secure and enhance its practical utility and on the other prevent its abuse.
The more important of these limitations will be discussed.
(1) OVER-RULED CASES.
If a decision has been expressly over-ruled
either by the same court whicI rendered it or by a court exercising appellate jurisdiction, it can, of course, no longer be cited as a precedent. The latest utterance of the court on any given point of law constitutes the authority which is not to be departed from without cause.
And the same is true of decisions over-ruled by necossarY implication in a subsequent case. Eut here it would be necessary to show beyond reasonable cavil that the two authorities were really and necessarily inconsistent rulings on a state of facts substantially identical. are not measured by its own idiosyncrasies; each of' these extremes always tends to be converted into the other and both stand rebuked in every voltue of our jurisprudence. Scott, 13 How., 269; Russell v. Southard, 12 How.,
139.)
CHAPTFR V.
T}HE RULE AS BETWEE2N
COURTS OF DIFIEREITT STATES.
Rulings nmde under a similar system of juris- Tendor Cases, 13 Wall., 457, riversing, " ''a.,60).
Neertheless, it has survived.
The great result of the doctrine and idea of Stare Decisis has been tat it has linked the whole of our law to-other with bonds stronger than philosophy or pure science could have constructed. As has been attented to be shown in the precedinf-pages of thils essay, without th-Loctrine there could be no suitable or consistent administration o JustiCe, no firm foundlation even to vested rights, no security to property.
